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ABSCAM AND THE CONSTITUTIONt 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW EN-
FORCEMENT. Edited by Gerald M. Caplan. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballin-
ger Publishing Co. 1983. Pp. x, 156. $19.95. 
This book, which consists of essays by some very smart people 
about ABSCAM and police undercover techniques, serves primarily to 
document our present confusion about criminal justice issues. In this 
essay, I want to identify two kinds of confusion from which we suffer 
and to show how each is linked to underlying problems with a separate 
theory of constitutional interpretation. 
I 
One sort of confusion, which is associated with a theory I will call 
"left-wing activism," emerges on the very first pages of the book. In 
the course of his spirited and otherwise cogent defense of the AB-
SCAM operation, Irvin Nathan writes: 
Detractors of ABSCAM attempt to portray an image of high-level Jus-
tice Department officials engaged in a crusade against selected public 
officials or seeking to test the honesty or morality of randomly chosen 
politicians. The truth of the matter, as shown by the evidence developed 
in eight public trials, is far different. [P. 5.] 
Now, it may be, as Nathan asserts, that ABSCAM involved "no 
targeting" (p. 4), and that there was "[no] government selection pro-
cess" (p. 4). It is possible as well, as he also asserts, that the govern-
ment wisely refrained from "offer[ing] a bribe to randomly selected 
public officials" (p. 9). But surely "the truth of the matter" must be 
one way or the other. Either targets were selected deliberately, or they 
were chosen randomly. 1 Nathan's simultaneous denial of both pro-
t My thanks to Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Pitofsky, Warren Schwartz, Girardeau 
Spann, Mark Tushnet, and Silas Wasserstrom, who commented on an earlier draft of this review, 
and to Mary Morton, who provided valuable research assistance. 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1968, University of Chicago; 
J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School. - Ed. 
1. At various places in his essay, Nathan seems to argue that there was no "government 
selection process" because the choice of targets was left to "corrupt intermediaries." See, e.g., 
pp. 4, 9. But, of course, the decision to set traps for those politicians identified by third parties 
itself constitutes a method of selection. It is unclear why Nathan thinks that this decision to 
delegate the selection process to private individuals, who were not publicly accountable and who, 
Nathan concedes, told "outright lies" about a number of politicians, p. 4, is a point in favor of 
the operation. 
Presumably, Nathan's insistence on the absence of "government selection" is motivated by 
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positions makes him like one of my former clients who testified at his 
robbery trial that he had not been at the scene of the crime, but that, 
in any event, the complainant could not possibly identify him because 
of the mask he was wearing at the time. 
Nathan's desire to have it both ways is interesting because it corre-
sponds to conflicting intuitions that most of us share about appropri-
ate constraints on police activity. On the one hand, we seem to believe 
that police intrusion is justified if the police know specific facts about 
the individual target sufficient to make it reasonable to single him out. 
Thus, Mark Moore quite sensibly argues that 
[a] rational enforcement enterprise (mindful of its obligation to solve 
crimes at low cost) would not willingly spend its resources searching in 
areas where the likelihood of finding a crime or a criminal was very 
low. . . . In this respect, the economizing interests of enforcement 
agencies parallel a legal interest in assuring that some justification can be 
given for focusing unusually extensive and intensive information gather-
ing in a limited area. [P. 24.] 
Yet on the other hand, we also think that police intrusion is justified if 
the police are not singling out an individual on the basis of any specific 
facts they know about him. Thus, Lawrence Sherman maintains that 
"relying on tips and other citizen-initiated methods of obtaining prob-
able cause to start an investigation is a wasteful and inequitable proce-
dure" (p. 125), and that equitable law enforcement requires "selecting 
individual targets for deceptive investigations in a way that gives each 
member of the target group an equal probability of being selected" (p. 
131). 
It is easy to see how current fourth amendment doctrine is caught 
between these two intuitions. In some contexts, the Supreme Court 
has told us that invasions of privacy are permissible only if the police 
demonstrate probable cause to believe that they will find what they are 
looking for.2 Yet the courts have also permitted practices like airport 
searches, 3 police roadblocks4 and inventory searches5 on the theory 
the desire to rebut the claim that the method of selection was invidious. And, indeed, there is no 
reason to doubt him when he asserts that "[n]o political official was put off limits; no allegation, 
regardless of the party, power, or position of the official involved was disregarded as too hot to 
pursue." P. 4. But the important institutional issue about ABSCAM is not the good faith of the 
particular officials who ran the operation, but the adequacy of safeguards against officials operat-
ing in bad faith. When the problem is viewed from this perspective, there is no escape from the 
fact that government officials must opt for some method of selection, that they may well know in 
advance the distributional consequences of the method they choose, and that they can, if they 
wish, manipulate their choice to achieve undesirable objectives. See text at notes 44-47 infra. 
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon prob-
able cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution."). 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 907 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The search ••. 
occurred as part of a screening process directed not against appellant or any other person as 
such, but rather against the general introduction of weapons or explosives in a restricted area. 
The search was indiscriminate, and • . . necessarily so, absent a foolproof means of isolating in 
advance those few individuals who were genuine hijack risks."). 
February 1985] ABSCAM and the Constitution 1201 
that the police lack any special reason to believe that a particular 
search will be productive. Indeed, in a stunning reversal of the central 
meaning of the fourth amendment, 6 the Court has on occasion held 
that the Constitution requires issuance of general warrants designed to 
insure that there is no particular basis for individual searches. 7 
A second sort of confusion, which is associated with a theory I will 
call "right-wing activism," is illustrated by Sanford Levinson's elo-
quent and erudite essay on the hidden costs of police undercover tech-
niques. Levinson argues that "our security about our lives is radically 
dependent on being able to trust 'normal appearances,' and attacks on 
this ability to trust may be devastating" (p. 51). Because undercover 
techniques are "deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship, love, 
and trust" (p. 50), those who advocate their use should have the bur-
den of proving their fairness. "Perhaps [they] can be defended, just as 
nonpacifists recognize the appropriate occasions for directed violence, 
but we should place greater barriers, including legal ones, in the way 
of casually embarking on such use" (p. 51). 
Levinson is surely right when he argues that in a sane society 
things must generally be as they appear to be. But his reasoning from 
this proposition to skepticism about undercover techniques masks a 
double paradox. 
First, undercover operations destroy our trust in "normal appear-
ances" only in a certain sense. To be sure, on an individual level, the 
informer or double agent fools his victim. But on a societal level, the 
government has abused no one's trust. On the contrary, it is usually 
perfectly open about the use of undercover techniques. 8 Indeed, the 
deterrent effect of undercover police work depends upon potential 
criminals knowing precisely the way things are. Only if the govern-
ment publicizes its use of double agents will people think twice about 
engaging in criminal conspiracies.9 Levinson's argument thus depends 
4. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976). Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stopping all traffic at roadblock may sufficiently constrain police dis-
cretion to satisfy fourth amendment). 
5. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
6. The fourth amendment was directed primarily at the problem of "general" or overbroad 
warrants not specifying the place to be searched or thing to be seized. See Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
41 (1969). 
1. See Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
8. For example, shortly after the ABSCAM operation was disclosed, FBI Director William 
Webster publicly announced that there were presently 50 similar operations underway across the 
country. P. 3. 
9. In defense of ABSCAM, Nathan argues that there is evidence that it has had a substantial 
deterrent effect. He cites testimony by FBI officials to the effect that suspects in continuing 
investigations attribute their caution to concerns about ABSCAM-type probes. P. 3. Obviously, 
this deterrent effect is possible only if potential violators know of the possibility that undercover 
operations are underway. 
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upon an undefended preference for accurate information when we 
make individual, rather than collective, choices. 
Second, it is, of course, true that when Congressman Kelly stuffed 
$25,000 in cash into his pockets before a hidden videotape camera, 
things were not the way they seemed to him at the time. But we 
should not lose sight of the fact that if Kelly was guilty, as the jury 
found him to be, he himself was engaged in undermining our trust in 
"normal appearances." While passing himself off as a public servant 
making decisions in the public interest, he in fact had a radically dif-
ferent agenda. Thus, from a different perspective, ABSCAM was an 
effort to restore our trust in normal appearances by apprehending 
those who violated it. Levinson's attack on operations of this sort 
rests on an undefended distinction between governmental action that 
deceives and governmental inaction that allows private deception to 
continue.10 This distinction is especially ironic in the ABSCAM con-
text, where the targets of the operation were themselves government 
officials engaged in deception. 
The problems in Levinson's essay, like those in Nathan's, are re-
flected in current fourth amendment doctrine. The problem posed by 
the dichotomy between individual and collective choice is reflected in 
the well-known circularity of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" 
test. The Court purports to apply this test to judge whether an indi-
vidual's fourth amendment interests have been invaded. 11 Yet those 
individual expectations are crucially conditioned by our collective 
judgments about what kinds of privacy we wish to preserve.12 Individ-
ual expectations are protected when they are reasonable. But they are 
reasonable only because we have collectively announced that we are 
going to protect them. 13 
10. In fairness, it should be noted that Levinson himself perceives this problem, although he 
provides no satisfactory solution for it. See p. 58. 
11. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (no fourth amendment interest in 
"open field" because owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
12. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), for example, the court held that a deposi-
tor's fourth amendment rights were not implicated by a search of bank records in part because 
"[t]he lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information ••• was assumed 
by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require 
records to be maintained because they 'have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and 
regulatory investigations and proceedings.' " 425 U.S. at 442-43. 
13. On rare occasions, the Court has glimpsed the nature of its dilemma. In Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), for example, the majority noted that "if the Government were sud-
denly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to 
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of 
privacy regarding their homes, papers and effects." 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. In such cases, where 
expectations could be said to have been " 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized 
Fourth Amendment freedoms," the Court acknowledged that expectations could "play no mean• 
ingful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was," and that "a 
normative inquiry would be proper." 442 U.S. at 741 n.5. But the Court gave no hint of how it 
would generate such norms when not guided by collective decisions about the amount of privacy 
we wish to protect. 
February 1985] ABSCAM and the Constitution 1203 
The second problem in Levinson's essay, posed by the dichotomy 
between public and private deception, is reflected in the incoherence of 
our fourth amendment rules regarding state action, privacy in one's 
relations with others, and searches conducted with the consent of third 
parties. Under current doctrine, an individual has a relatively strong 
expectation that the government will not employ its own mechanisms 
of coercion or deception to invade an existing privacy interest. But 
individuals have no constitutional right to affirmative government pro-
tection from private invasions.14 Nor is there a right to prevent the 
government from taking advantage of any private invasion that does 
occur.15 Thus, in a real sense, the Constitution leaves citizens isolated 
in their privacy. A person who barricades himself alone in his home 
can be relatively secure in his person, house, papers and effects. But 
the government provides no security for those without the means to so 
protect themselves, and as soon as a person establishes an intimate 
relationship with another, he is said to "assume the risk" that he will 
be betrayed.16 Indeed, ironically enough, the more intimate the rela-
tionship detroyed by the deceptive conduct, the less protection the 
fourth amendment affords. Thus, the fourth amendment rights of a 
hotel guest are violated if the manager gives the room key to the po-
lice, because the guest has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his 
room. 17 Yet if the suspect's spouse admits the police to a house they 
share, 18 or his best friend turns double agent and tells the police about 
their most private conversations, 19 no fourth amendment problem 
arises. 
II 
I suppose I had better make clear that I have not a clue as to how 
these various paradoxes and anomalies should be resolved. I do think, 
however, that there is something to be learned by putting them into a 
broader context. A peculiar coincidence in the history of academic 
discourse about criminal justice has, I believe, artificially narrowed its 
scope: At roughly the same time that the modern flowering of consti-
tutional theory began, the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions 
became too numerous and complex to fit comfortably into courses on 
constitutional law. It was also during this period that the clinical 
movement began to take hold. The result has been the development of 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
15. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
16. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 
U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
17. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). 
19. See, e.g., cases listed at note 16 supra. 
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separate criminal law courses staffed by academics, many of whom 
think of themselves as pursuing a discipline different from "standard" 
constitutional law. This split has tended to obscure the fact that the 
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments are, after all, parts of the Constitu-
tion, and that the same theories that have influenced application of the 
rest of the document have implications for our thinking about control 
of the police. If we consider police undercover work in this broader 
context, I think we can see that the problems in the Nathan and Lev-
inson essays reflect our ambivalence about competing theories of con-
stitutional adjudication. 
In the unlikely event that the man from Mars is an avid reader of 
our major law journals, he would no doubt suppose that this competi-
tion between theories consists primarily of an argument between advo-
cates of judicial activism and judicial restraint. For the past several 
generations, academic discussion has been dominated by efforts to 
wrestle with the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and to develop a 
comprehensive theory justifying and limiting judicial review. It 
would, of course, be possible to view the problem of police undercover 
work through this lens. Were we to do so, we would look for a justifi-
cation - in the text of the Constitution, in political theory, or in 
moral philosophy, depending on one's taste in these matters - for 
overriding the judgment of the police and, by extension, that of the 
political branches regarding the proper tradeoff between privacy and 
crime control. 
But it should be apparent to anyone not from Mars that this dis-
pute is sadly out of date. Academics who believe that judicial activism 
is fundamentally illegitimate may, in some abstract sense, be right, but 
the simple fact of the matter is that today advocates of judicial re-
straint are everywhere in retreat. There is not now a single authentic 
such advocate sitting on the Supreme Court, and there has not been 
one in recent memory.20 If one wants to understand what modem 
constitutional debate is really about, the beginning of wisdom is that 
the fault line is not between activism and restraint, but between differ-
ing styles of activism. 
For the sake of convenience, and at the risk of considerable over-
simplification, these styles may be labelled "left-wing" and "right-
wing." Left-wing judicial activists believe in an active court as part of 
an active government. They believe that government as a whole 
should intervene vigorously in the private sphere to redistribute assets 
20. Justice Rehnquist, widely considered the most likely candidate, is certainly not in this 
category. He has dissented from the Court's relatively lenient constitutional scrutiny of statutes 
benefiting racial minorities, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart, J,, with 
whom Rehnquist, J., joins, dissenting), and has insisted on the Supreme Court's duty to invali-
date federal invasions of state sovereignty despite the absence of any clear textual justification for 
the assertion of this power. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also 
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 302-07 (1976). 
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in a more just and equitable fashion and to correct the abuses of pri-
vate power. When the political branches default in this obligation, 
then the courts must intervene to achieve the same ends.21 Cases such 
as Brown v. Board of Education, 22 Shapiro v. Thompson23 and Craig v. 
Boren24 are representative of this tradition. 
In contrast, right-wing judicial activists believe in an active court 
because they believe in a passive government. They believe that out-
comes reached by the private sphere should be protected from govern-
mental intermeddling. When the political branches invade this sphere, 
then it becomes the duty of courts to restrain them through vigorous 
and expansive assertion of constitutional values. 25 Cases such as Loch-
ner v. New York, 26 Roe v. Wade 27 and The Pentagon Papers28 fall 
squarely in this tradition. 
To be sure, like all models, this way of categorizing empirical data 
oversimplifies reality. In particular, it would be a mistake to suppose 
that the views of any individual Justice can be neatly categorized 
under one rubric or another. There are numerous crosscurrents that 
influence the Justices' votes and the results in individual cases. None-
theless, the model has considerable explanatory power. For one thing, 
it helps explain how it is that a Court appointed by Presidents who 
made "judicial activism" dirty words has turned out to be one of the 
most activist in our history.29 The political attack on the Court in the 
21. For a representative example of this view, see Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a 
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 6 (1968): 
Where the choice is between the Court struggling alone with a social issue and the legisla-
ture dealing with it expertly, legislative action is to be preferred. All too often, however, the 
practical choice has been between the Court doing the job as best it can and no one doing it 
at all. Faced with these alternatives, the court must assume the legislature's responsibility. 
If the legislature simply cannot or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the 
Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so. 
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
23. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
25. For a classic statement of this view, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399,401 (1923) 
(McReynolds, J.): 
[The "liberty" protected by the Constitution] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations oflife, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized by common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men .... 
That the state may do much, go very far indeed, in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamen-
tal rights which must be respected. 
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
28. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
29. To cite but one dramatic example, by striking down the legislative veto provision at issue 
in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Burger Court 
invalidated in a single day more federal statutes than had previously been struck down in the 
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'60s and early '70s was not really an attack on activism at all, but 
rather an attack on left-wing activism. The Burger Court's response 
to that attack has not been a retreat from the exercise of judicial 
power, but rather an expansive reading of the Constitution to protect 
private power centers from governmental interference. For example, 
the Court has virtually ceded the troubling abortion question to the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists to resolve in any 
way it sees fit.30 The press,31 organized religion,32 families33 and cor-
porations34 have all been told in one way or another that the Constitu-
tion leaves them free to exercise private power without having to 
account to public institutions for the manner in which that power is 
exercised. 
Moreover, the model also helps explain some contradictions that 
otherwise appear inexplicable. The abortion funding controversy pro-
vides a particularly revealing example. How can the same Court that 
vigorously defends a woman's right to an abortion also permit the gov-
ernment to "penalize" a woman for exercising that right by withhold-
ing funds that she could have if she chose to have a live birth?35 This 
seemingly anomalous result becomes perfectly sensible once one un-
derstands that Roe was a product of right-wing activism. The distinc-
tion between the imposition of a burden and the withholding of a 
benefit, although ultimately incoherent, 36 is crucial to the right-wing 
world view, and reliance on the distinction has become a hallmark of 
the Burger Court.37 Thus, on this view, Roe was right because it left a 
woman and her doctor free to resolve the abortion question without 
entire history of the country. See Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. RBV, 
473, 473 (1984). See also notes 30-34 infra. 
30. See, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2495-96 
(1983) (deferring to judgment of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as well as 
American Public Health Association on permissibility of out-patient abortions); see also Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396-97 (1977) (determination whether fetus is viable must be left to 
attending physician). 
31. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating prior restraint 
in press coverage of criminal trial). 
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (application of 
National Labor Relations Act to employees of church-related schools would raise serious free 
exercise clause problems). 
33. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically 
has reflected Western Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority 
over minor children. . • . The statist notion that government power should supersede parental 
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American 
tradition."). 
34. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating statute prohibit-
ing expenditures by banks and corporations for purpose of influencing votes on referenda 
proposals). 
35. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
36. See note 42 infra and accompanying text. 
37. As Justice Powell wrote for the Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977): 
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional 
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government intermeddling. But for precisely the same reasons, Harris 
v. McCrae was also right because government funding of abortions was 
itself a kind of interference with outcomes that would be reached in 
the private sphere without government interference. 
Of course, the left-wing activist sees things quite differently. He 
believes that government has an obligation to intervene when private 
forces (in this case the market) lead to inequitable outcomes. Indeed, 
his support for Roe in the first place was premised on the assumption 
that it would lead to a redistribution of power between men and 
women.38 Through attacks on the right-privilege distinction and ex-
ploitation of the "fundamental interest" stand of equal protection ju-
risprudence, the Warren Court had laid the doctrinal groundwork that 
would have supported a constitutional obligation for government to 
subsidize abortions. 39 But the days of the Warren Court are long be-
hind us. Because Roe was a right-wing rather than a left-wing deci-
sion, the result in Harris was foreordained. 
III 
If the man from Mars has managed to slog his way through this 
much of the Michigan Law Review, he might suppose that protection 
from police abuse was high on the agenda of the right wing. In fact, 
there is a surprisingly conservative flavor to much of our fourth 
amendment jurisprudence - a flavor that comes through in Levin-
son's essay. The fourth amendment, after all, is a restraint on the ex-
ercise of government power, and it pretty much leaves people where it 
finds them. If they live in overcrowded slum housing with paper thin 
walls, then, at least under present doctrine, they have the right to the 
kind of privacy one would expect in that environment. But if they live 
in mansions with private security guards, the government is restrained 
from changing this "natural" state of affairs by imposing additional 
privacy costs that would not otherwise exist. 
Of course, in the real world, it has been the right wing that has led 
the attack on the fourth amendment. The reasons why this is so are of 
interest, I believe, because they help to demonstrate the problems with 
right-wing activism generally. 
There are two sorts of problems with the right-wing view which, 
concerns are greater when the state attempts to impose its will by force of law; the state's 
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
For some examples of Burger Court decisions resting on this distinction, see Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); 
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
38. For a defense of Roe on these grounds, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 955, 980.81 (1984). 
39. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the 
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
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usefully enough, correspond to the anomalies in Levinson's essay. The 
first stems from the need to reconcile right-wing activism with a coher-
ent theory of freedom. All too often, it is supposed that recognition of 
constitutional rights leaves individuals free. But of course nothing 
could be further from the truth. Disabling government does not make 
people free; it simply substitutes private for public coercion. Thus, 
getting the government out of the abortion business does not leave a 
woman "free" to choose which course to follow. She remains at the 
mercy of her doctor, or her parents, or her husband, all of whom may 
exercise coercive power over her.40 Indeed, government intervention to 
control the exercise of private power may be an essential precondition 
to real freedom.41 
Similarly, constitutional restraints on undercover police work 
hardly guarantee a society where privacy and expectations in "normal 
appearances" are protected. They simply mean that con-men and 
thugs rather than the police will control our lives. This is why Levin-
son's failure to defend a distinction between government action that 
deceives and government inaction that allows private deception to 
continue is troubling. For conservatives, the prospect of government 
inaction in this context is especially troubling because criminals, un-
like, say, the New York Times or General Motors, are likely to use 
their unrestrained power to effect a substantial change in the way as-
sets are presently distributed. 
Right-wing activists might avoid these dilemmas by claiming that 
theirs is not a theory based on freedom in the first place. They might 
claim instead that government should be restrained because the defects 
in the political process prevent it from aggregating individual prefer-
ences as accurately as private markets. Of course, choices in private 
markets are "coerced" in the sense that everything has a price. But 
the trades that occur in such markets are nonetheless desirable because 
the necessity to pay the price assures that utility will be maximized. 
But there is a problem with reconciling this utility-based view with 
right-wing activism as well. The problem is that government interven-
tion is necessary in order to determine and protect the initial assign-
ment of property rights that allows the market to function. The way 
in which it functions, in turn, will depend upon the kind of property 
rights government chooses to recognize at the outset. For example, if 
40. The internal tensions in the right-wing position are particularly apparent when dealing 
with minors, for here the problem of private coercion is a~ute. Arguably, this problem has 
caused the Court to turn the principle of Roe on its head. Instead of removing government from 
the abortion decision, the Court has held that in some circumstances the Constitution requires a 
government official to make the decision for immature minors. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622, 643-44 (1979) (Powell, J.). 
41. Of course, such intervention leaves the people controlled by it less free. Thus, the real 
choice is not between tyranny and freedom. Whatever the government does - or does not do -
one group will get its way and the other will not. The real choice is simply between the compet-
ing claims of those groups. 
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we start by recognizing a property right in medical benefits to fund 
abortions (in which case, their withdrawal is an unconstitutional bur-
den), the market for abortions will be different than it would be if we 
recognize no such property right (in which case, the failure to provide 
the benefits is a constitutional refusal to subsidize). Which course we 
follow can be determined only by some sort of collective, governmen-
tal choice. 42 
The problem of choosing a starting point for measuring fourth 
amendment violations is precisely analogous, and it is this problem 
that is reflected in Levinson's difficulties in distinguishing between the 
legitimacy of individual and collective decisions. It is fine to say that 
the police should not upset reasonable privacy expectations. But this 
command is coherent only if we establish as an initial matter what 
claims of privacy we are prepared to recognize as reasonable, and this 
initial choice must, again, be a collective decision. Once the decision is 
made - and however it is made - it will then crucially influence the 
kinds of expectations private individuals have and the ways in which 
they behave. Hence, the notion of private individuals exercising power 
without government influence or interference is logically incoherent. 
Unfortunately, there are similar logical difficulties with the theory 
of left-wing activism. At first, it may seem strange that left-wing activ-
ists are worried about the fourth amendment at all. Vigorous police 
activity represents an exercise of government power that arguably 
serves to redistribute the cost of crime in a more equitable fashion. 
Police protection is a kind of public subsidy for people without the 
means to protect themselves. 
But of course, left-wing activists know that the cost of this subsidy 
is not equitably distributed. Far from redistributing power in a fairer 
fashion, left-wing activists fear that the police will aggravate the ex-
isting maldistribution of wealth and power by picking on "discrete and 
insular minorities." It is this fear, I think, that lies behind Nathan's 
impulse to insist that ABSCAM targets were not deliberately selected 
and Lawrence Sherman's proposal that "sting" victims be randomly 
chosen.43 It is not the simple fact of government selection that trou-
42. In Harris, for example, the majority concedes that "[a] substantial constitutional question 
would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligi-
ble candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom 
to terminate her pregnancy by abortion." 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. In contrast, the failure to 
provide medicaid funds for abortions was a mere "refusal to fund protected activity" which, 
"without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 448 U.S. 
at 317 n.19. But it should be obvious that this distinction between "penalties" and "failures to 
subsidize" depends entirely on how one characterizes the baseline entitlement against which gov-
ernment conduct is measured. If one characterizes the baseline as "medicaid benefits" then the 
exclusion of funds for abortion is a mere failure to subsidize. But if one characterizes it instead as 
"benefits available to pregnant women," then the withdrawal of those benefits from the class of 
women who make a constitutionally protected choice with regard to their pregnancy begins to 
look more like a penalty. -
43. See pp. 118-33. 
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bles them, but the risk that any selection process will be abused so as 
to punish unpopular minorities. This fear also explains much that 
otherwise appears contradictory in fourth amendment law. Because 
we cannot trust the police to distribute privacy costs equitably, they 
must either convince a judicial official that they have a sound basis for 
picking out individuals for special treatment, or distribute costs widely 
enough so that we can be sure that the political check on their activity 
will not be negated by the powerlessness of a specially disadvantaged 
group. 
There are, I think, two sorts of difficulties with this position. First, 
left-wing activists need to get straight what they think about govern-
ment. One view, which seems to lie behind the left-wing version of the 
fourth amendment, is that private inequalities will inevitably translate 
into unequal political power. We therefore cannot trust the political 
branches to distribute privacy costs equitably when they go about the 
task of fighting crime. But it is hardly sensible to believe this while 
simultaneously looking to government as an engine for social reform. 
And it seems particularly bizarre to expect judges - who remain far 
richer, better educated, whiter, and maier than the majority of us - to 
be the government officials who rescue us from these difficulties and 
bring about a just redistribution. 
A second problem stems from an ambiguity in the concepts of 
"randomness" and "equality" that lie at the heart of the left-wing the-
ory. 44 Sherman argues that it is a requirement of equitable law en-
forcement that "each member of the target group [have] an equal 
probability of being selected" (p. 131). But it is hard to know precisely 
what he means by this requirement. Suppose, for example, that the 
police are looking for heroin hidden in automobiles and are choosing 
between three criteria for selecting the cars to be searched. They can 
search all cars with odd-numbered license plates, they can search all 
cars in those neighborhoods where heroin traffic is concentrated, or 
they can search all cars driven by people who, for one reason or an-
other, appear not to be members of the middle class. 
The first thing to notice about this choice is that none of the op-
tions is "random" if one means by this term a method of choice in-
volving no criterion of selection. Indeed, given determinist premises, 
such a requirement is impossible to satisfy. Nor can any choice satisfy 
a requirement of "equality," if one means by this term that ex ante all 
cars will have an equal probability of selection. An important theme 
reflected in a number of essays in this book is that this requirement is 
also impossible to satisfy. The government must decide upon some 
method of selection, and any method it chooses will have distribu-
tional consequences. Thus, as Mark Moore (p. 37), Wayne Kerstetter 
(pp. 135-36), and Peter Reuter (p. 115) all argue, our traditional "reac-
44. I am grateful to one of my students, David Post, for introducing me to this problem. 
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tive" mode of law enforcement, under which police investigations are 
triggered by victim complaints and probable cause is required for pri-
vacy invasions, leaves white-collar and "victimless" crimes substan-
tially underenforced. Similarly, in some sense, searching only those 
cars with certain license plates "discriminates" against the people who 
happen to have those plates. 
Presumably, then, Sherman's insistence on randomness and equal-
ity does not require that the mode of selection have no distributional 
consequences, but rather that the person choosing the mode not know 
the consequences in advance.45 Under this definition, the first method 
of selection is "random," because having odd-numbered license plates 
is unlikely to be systematically associated with any other trait govern-
ment officials will be aware of when they choose this method. In con-
trast, the second two methods of selection are not random because 
middle-class appearance and location in a particular area are associ-
ated with other traits. 
If this is what Sherman means, his definition is at least logically 
coherent, but it is not immediately apparent why he thinks that this 
kind of randomness is a virtue. From an efficiency perspective, it 
seems silly to search all cars with odd-numbered license plates when 
we could find more heroin at a lower cost by concentrating our search 
on cars more likely to contain the drug.46 Nor is it clear how equality 
is promoted by this policy. There is nothing "equal" about applying 
the same criterion to two groups who are differently situated with re-
spect to the criterion. Thus, persons having traits making them less 
likely to possess drugs can complain of unequal treatment because 
they have the same chance of being searched as persons for whom the 
search is more likely to be productive. Similarly, owners of cars with 
odd-numbered license plates are victimized by unequal treatment be-
cause they are treated differently on the basis of a trait that has no 
association with the goal the government wishes to advance. This 
45. Of course, the person choosing the mode of selection will know the distributional conse-
quences with respect to the criterion for selection. Thus, searching cars with odd-numbered 
license plates has distributional consequences, known in advance, for the class of persons with 
those license plates. But no one is likely to know in advance what other traits are possessed by 
this class. 
46. Thus, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978), the Court held unconstitutional "ran-
dom" or "discretionary" stops of motor vehicles to check for vehicle registration, in part because 
"finding an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely 
event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing 11t random from the entire universe of driv-
ers. • • . In terms of actually discovering unlicensed drivers or deterring them from driving, the 
spot check does not appear sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement 
practice under the Fourth Amendment." 440 U.S. at 659-60. But given this objection, it is 
unclear, to say the least, why the Court was ready to approve "methods for spot checks that . . . 
do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." 440 U.S. at 663. One gets a sense of the 
amount of confusion it is possible to generate about this issue from Justice Blackmum's readiness 
to approve techniques like the search of every tenth car because they are said to be "not purely 
random." 440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
1212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1199 
kind of "randomness" is indistinguishable from the sort of irrational-
ity that makes government conduct unconstitutional under even mini-
mal equal protection scrutiny.47 The possibility of condemning 
"randomness" on these grounds presumably accounts for Nathan's de-
sire to deny that the selection of ABSCAM targets was random. 
Thus, from both equality and efficiency perspectives, it seems more 
sensible to prefer a nonrandom method of selection based, for exam-
ple, on the area of the city in which the car is located. And yet, I think 
at least some of us would be troubled by this method, and more trou-
bled still by a method of selection based on lower-class or deviant ap-
pearances, even if it could be shown that there was a correlation 
between these traits and drug use. Presumably, we are worried that 
the police have chosen these criteria not because of the correlation, but 
because the group selected is a "discrete and insular minority" victim-
ized by prejudice and unable to form the sort of political coalitions 
that would protect it from discriminatory treatment. Insisting on ig-
norance of distributional consequences thus sacrifices some efficiency, 
but in return we gain assurance that the system will produce no per-
manent losers made to bear disproportionate costs because of preju-
dice against them. 
But the difficulty with making this sacrifice is that it ignores the 
possibility that a group selected for disfavored treatment is a discrete 
and insular minority precisely because of the correlation that makes 
picking this group out the sensible and equitable thing to do. Of 
course, there are losers in the political process who consistently and 
over a broad range of issues come out on the bottom. But it is at least 
theoretically possible that some of these groups consistently lose be-
cause they deserve to lose in the sense that membership in the group in 
fact consistently correlates with undesirable activity that society 
wishes to discourage. 
It is also true that other groups may be singled out for "discrimina-
tory" treatment based, not on the incidence of undesirable activity, but 
on "prejudice." The dominant culture may have a distorted view of 
the characteristics of the disfavored group or may fail to count fairly 
their desires in determining social policy. But the important point is 
that mere political powerlessness, even when coupled with "discrete-
ness" and "insularity," is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. Polit-
ical powerlessness may reflect no more than a loss "on the merits." 
Permitting judges to reverse political decisions when they are "suspi-
41. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring): 
So far as the State's purpose is concerned, every ..• claimant's charge, when filed with the 
[Fair Employment Practices] Commission, stands on the same footing. Yet certain ran-
domly selected claims, because processed too slowly by the State, are irrevocably terminated 
without review ...• This, I believe, is the very essence of arbitrary state action [violating 
the Equal Protection Clause]. 
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cious" that the decision is based on "prejudice" permits them, in ef-
fect, to redetermine the merits. Left-wing activists have yet to explain 
how the cause of social justice is advanced by this transfer of power. 
IV 
One of the important contributions of ABSCAM Ethics is that it 
accurately captures the ambivalence many of us feel about police un-
dercover work. The public clearly enjoys watching criminals or cor-
rupt politicians get "stung," and the essays by Nathan, Moore, and 
Reuter make a convincing case that such operations may,. on occasion, 
serve useful purposes. Yet this public approval is tempered by a vague 
feeling of unease - an inchoate sense, reflected in last year's 
DeLorean verdict and captured dramatically in Gary Marx's essay, 
that "we may be taking small but steady steps toward the paranoia 
and suspicion that characterize many totalitarian countries" (p. 94). 
In part, I think this ambivalence reflects the fact that many of us 
are tom between the attractions of left-wing and right-wing activism. 
We want strong leaders and a competent government that will protect 
us and provide for us. Yet we also want to be left alone. 
But I think that there is also a sense in which our ambivalence 
stems from the internal incoherence of both the left-wing and right-
wing views. I have argued that some of our confusion about criminal 
justice issues can be clarified by sharply distinguishing between these 
views. But in important ways, both theories are also alike. They are 
both distorted by our loss of confidence in our ability to articulate any 
substantive vision of how we wish to interact with each other. Right-
wing activists need a substantive theory of freedom that will explain 
the way people would act in a world where they were not coerced. 
Left-wing activists need a substantive theory of equality that will ex-
plain how groups would be aligned in a just society. In the absence of 
such theories, both camps have directed their attention to "value-free" 
procedural questions, while professing indifference to the outcomes 
produced by these procedures. Thus, left-wing activists see courts as 
intervening when necessary to correct defects in public markets, while 
right-wing activists see them as intervening when necessary to prevent 
interference with private markets. Because both of these procedural 
approaches are seriously flawed, it is predictable that our thinking 
about controlling the police - and about constitutional law in general 
- will remain unsatisfactory. 
